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What are qualia? Qualia —
singular quale — is the
philosophical term for the
introspectively accessible,
phenomenal aspects of our lives,
the elemental feelings and
sensations that are the building
blocks of conscious experience.
Qualia are at the very heart of the
mind–body problem. How do the
salty taste and crunchy texture of
potato chips, the unmistakable
smell of dogs after they have been
in the rain, or the sensation of
seeing red relate to the ever
shifting patterns of electrical
activity in the brain?
Why should you, as a biologist,
care about qualia? The only way
you know about the world,
including your body, is by
experiencing sensations or
thoughts.
Do you need qualia? Not
necessarily. Much of what goes on
in the brain is not associated with
qualia. Electrophysiological
experiments prove that furious
activity in legions of cortical
neurons can fail to generate a
conscious percept. In a reflex
action, you will move your hand
away from a hot burner before you
consciously feel its heat. Many
complex sensory-motor behaviors
are similarly rapid and
nonconscious. Anytime you drive a
car, ride a bicycle, return a ball in
tennis or climb a rock wall, your
brain uses visual and other sensory
cues to generate a very rapid,
adaptive motor response. And
much, if not most of this, bypasses
consciousness. Francis Crick and I
dubbed such automatic, highly
trained sensory-motor systems
‘zombie agents’. The clumsy
behavior of sleep-walkers or of
patients with automatisms that can
occur during epileptic seizures
might result from inactivation of the
the neural system(s) sufficient for
consciousness.
Why is brain activity that
triggers zombie behaviors
insufficient for consciousness?
Experiments suggests that the
neural activity underlying a quale
must be sustained for at least
several hundred milliseconds and
is all-or-none. That is, on any given
trial, conscious perception for any
one attribute is not graded but
either is experienced or not,
reflecting the dynamics of the
underlying neuronal coalitions. It
has been argued that feedback
from higher cortical regions to
lower ones is critical for the genesis
of a conscious percept.
How can qualia be studied in an
empirical manner? Psychologists
have at their disposal many ways of
hiding a stimulus from
consciousness. These methods
work best for vision. Lateral
masking, binocular rivalry, flash
suppression, change blindness or
motion-induced blindness (Figure
1) are illusions in which something
in plain view is not consciously
perceived. In these cases, the
unvoiced assumption of a
straightforward relationship
between a physical stimulus in the
world and the associated quale in
your head is violated. You may not
see the stimulus, even though it is
perfectly visible. Where in your
brain, or that of a macaque monkey
trained to push a button each time
the stimulus becomes visible, are
the neurons that are only active
when the stimulus is consciously
seen? Electrophysiological
experiments show that individual
neurons in the early stages of the
visual pathway — the lateral
geniculate nucleus (LGN) and the
primary visual cortex (V1) — care
little about the percept, firing in
response to the physical presence
of a particular stimulus: the
exuberant spiking activity of tens of
thousands or more of neurons in
these regions does not appear to
contribute to the subject’s percept.
But neurons in the inferior temporal
cortex, in monkeys, or the medial
temporal lobe, in humans, fire only
when the stimulus is actually
consciously seen by the subject.
When the image isn’t seen, the
neurons are quiet. In this way, the
footsteps of consciousness can be
tracked throughout the brain.
Is there any hope of moving
from mere correlation to
causation? Yes. This requires
behavioral assays, tasks that in
humans require conscious
awareness and that can be
extended to mice, flies or other
genetic model organisms. Animals
that pass such a battery of tests —
akin to the Turing test for artificial
intelligence — could be considered
to be conscious to some degree. A
crucial component of any such
assay must be the storage of
information for at least a few
seconds. Certain forms of
associative Pavlovian aversive
conditioning appear quite
promising. Conventional
pharmacological intervention,
combined with more targeted
molecular protocols can then be
devised to selectively, transiently,
reversibly, and delicately inactivate
populations of neurons that
underlie these tasks. In this way,
the neuronal correlates of
consciousness can be discovered
and characterized.
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Figure 1. In motion-induced blindness, the
swirling cloud of blue dots transiently sup-
presses the conscious percept of one or
both bright, yellow squares. Modified from
Bonneh et al. (2001). Nature 411, 798-801.
